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ABSTRACT 
 
 Due in part to the short amount of time since the American farm crisis of 
the 1980s, few historians have done much research on the topic. Even fewer have 
examined the activism of this time, and those who have suggest that farm crisis activists 
were less confrontational and more compromise and consensus oriented in their 
approach than earlier farm organizations. This study contributes to a more robust 
understanding of the wide-ranging nature of activism during this period by examining 
the foundations and work of an Iowa-based community organizing group named Iowa 
Citizens for Community Improvement (CCI). An analysis of interviews with members 
and organizers of the group, internal notes and planning documents, newspaper articles, 
books, and journal articles provide a detailed look at how the group operated. This study 
explores Saul Alinsky’s idea of community organizing, CCI’s work during the farm 
crisis, and its later work with a growing Latino population in the state of Iowa. It 
explores how CCI’s confrontational actions and radical ideas helped farmers save their 
farms and how its persistence and cultural competency helped immigrants create a 
soccer league, recover from devastating immigration raids, and reclaim stolen wages. 
Using untapped sources, this project will help illuminate the work of an organization that 
scholars have largely ignored until now.  
 
 1
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1980, with the election of Ronald Reagan, the United States took a 
conservative turn. Many Americans had grown tired of the internal struggles the nation 
had experienced in the previous decades, from the southern civil rights movement to 
violent antiwar protests. Americans fought each other for decades about the changing 
roles of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, as well as women. For many, the 
radicalism of the early seventies was just too much. As movements defined by marches 
and calls for peace increasingly became identified with acts of violence and calls for the 
overthrow of the U.S. government, the public grew increasingly uncomfortable with 
radicalism. For many Americans, the economic malaise experienced during the Carter 
administration served as further proof that the U.S. needed to return to conservative 
values. The Reagan Revolution took place during the 1980s and conservative politics 
have held sway ever since. Conservatism became the new orthodoxy, and radicalism 
became heresy.1 
Along with the political climate, activism also changed in the 1980s. By in large, 
activists did not shut down universities, enter state capitols while heavily armed, nor 
fight with police. Instead, they held hands and benefit concerts. The prominent causes of 
the time were still important in activist circles. For example, people fought against 
                                                        
1
 Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: How the GOP Made Political History, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1996). 
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apartheid in South Africa, they raised awareness about AIDS, and they pushed for 
greater equality for LGBT people across the country. What changed was the approach to 
activism. The conservative times called for more conservative tactics, policy goals, and 
expectations. Perhaps most importantly, fewer people were interested in social 
movements and activism in general. Organizers continued to put together events, but the 
marches and protests were smaller and there was certainly less talk of revolution2.  
Arguably, the largest area of social unrest in America during this somnolent 
decade was in the most conservative part of the country outside of the South, the 
Midwest. Agricultural states and communities suffered from a farm crisis, causing 
remarkably rapid social change during the 1980s.3 Changes in federal policies, 
technologies, and global demand made farming economically unsustainable for many 
people. This drove many out of farming and the Midwest altogether. Rates of violence, 
including suicide, as well as other social and personal ills rose significantly across rural 
America. Governments, communities, families, and activist groups all responded 
differently to the crisis. The farm crisis turned the Midwest into a hotbed of activism, but 
an activism tempered by the times. Some historians, including Mark Friedberger and 
Jenny Barker Divine, have referred to farm crisis activism as “feminized.”4 They claim 
that the “farm advocacy and activism during the farm crisis focused less on 
                                                        
2
 Hodgson, World Turned Right. 
3
 This period is also referred to as the “farm crisis of the 1980s,” the “farm financial crisis,” the “1980s 
Midwest farm crisis,” and numerous other derivations of this type. For simplicity, the phrase “farm crisis” 
will be used. 
4
 Jenny Barker Devine, “Our Cherished Ideals: Rural Women, Activism, and Identity in the Midwest, 
1950-1990” (PhD diss., Iowa State University, Ames, 2008). In this text Barker Devine paraphrases and 
further elaborates ideas set forth in Mark Friedberger, “Women Advocates in the Iowa Farm Crisis of the 
1980s,” Agricultural History 67 (Spring 1993): 224-234. 
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confrontation and more on peaceful mediation and conflict resolution.”5 According to 
Friedberger, the Iowa Farm Unity Coalition, a coalition of farm crisis activist groups, 
represented the tone of activism at the time. Friedberger wrote that the coalition “had 
none of the ‘macho’ image of earlier farm organizations. The coalition saw that while 
shock tactics were a useful weapon in gaining attention in the early stages of the 
crisis…far more useful were methods that were recognizably feminine in character.”6 
While the “feminized” versus “macho” dichotomy is limited in its explanatory power, 
this argument might explain why people remember the farm crisis for its Farm Aid 
concerts, rather than firebrand activists.  
Farm crisis activism did have a gentler, less confrontational tone, but many 
organizations clung to a more aggressive activist tradition. Iowa Citizens for Community 
Improvement (CCI), for instance, stood apart from most of the other organizations active 
during the farm crisis. Their philosophy and tactics came down in a nearly unbroken line 
from the famed community organizing radical Saul Alinsky. The policies CCI advocated 
were undeniably radical, their tactics were technically legal, but rather out of the 
ordinary, and their unwillingness to compromise with their opponents left them more 
often than not ostracized by fellow farm crisis organizations.7  
As the farm crisis unfolded, Iowa changed drastically. It had lost a considerable 
percentage of its population as young people fled the state in search of nonfarm jobs. 
The number of people who were involved in agriculture dropped considerably. Larger 
                                                        
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Friedberger, “Women Advocates,” 224-234. 
7
 Ibid; Larry Ginter, personal interview, September 26, 2011. I interviewed Larry Ginter at his family farm 
in Rhodes, Iowa. 
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farmers who managed to survive the crisis bought up the farms of those who did not, 
consolidating larger and larger tracts of land under the control and ownership of a 
relatively small number of people. This new landscape posed a number of problems for 
those who still lived in Iowa during the 1990s and the 2000s. The most pressing issues 
related to the need for younger people in the state to fill the schools and provide a 
workforce.  
Iowans turned toward the growing number of immigrants coming into the U.S. to 
meet these needs. Many of these immigrants came to the U.S. from rural Mexico. Like 
their American counterparts, many Mexican farmers were forced out of farming as a 
direct result of public policies that were intended to modernize the economy. For the 
Mexican farmers, this policy came in the form of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which policymakers had intended to gradually move small-scale, 
sometimes subsistence, farmers out of farming and into low-skill, low-wage 
manufacturing jobs.8 Unfortunately, the transition was not gradual, nor were there 
enough low-wage manufacturing jobs once China joined the G20.9 Mexican farmers 
could not compete against the soil, climate, technology, and the massive subsidies 
enjoyed by the American commercial farmers, and since Mexico lacked a substantial 
welfare state to support transitions to new professions, many farm families journeyed to 
Iowa and other parts of the U.S. 
                                                        
8
 Sidney Weintraub, “NAFTA and Migration,” National Forum 74 (Summer 1994): 29-34. 
9
 Sandra Polanski, “Mexican Employment, Productivity, and Income a Decade after NAFTA,” A brief 
produced by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. February 25, 2004. 
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CCI continued to organize in Iowa as the state’s population, economy, and 
culture shifted. This thesis examines how this group of Alinskites functioned in the state 
throughout the farm crisis and how it adjusted to the state’s changing demographics. It 
explores the causes of the upheaval felt by rural residents in the U.S. and Mexico in the 
1980s and 1990s, and the crucial role of cultural competency in community organizing. 
It seeks to explain how a radical group has managed to thrive in a conservative part of 
the country during a thirty-year conservative hegemony. I argue that CCI is a notable 
example of the Alinsky activist organizing tradition, one that existed in a period of 
supposed activist inactivity. As such, this thesis offers an alternate understanding of farm 
activism and differs from the assertions of Friedberger and Barker Divine. They have 
claimed that the activism of the farm crisis focused on finding compromise rather than 
fomenting conflict. CCI organizers, following Alinsky’s belief that conflict was 
necessary for change, rejected compromise out of principle. I, therefore, offer a more 
nuanced analysis and understanding of activism during the farm crisis. This thesis first 
introduces community organizing founder Saul Alinsky. It then looks at the founding 
and early years of CCI. Next, it explores the organization’s work during the farm crisis. 
Then it explains the effects of NAFTA, and, finally, CCI’s work with immigrants. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FROM THE BACK OF THE YARDS TO THE BACK FORTY 
 
 
More than anyone else, Saul Alinsky is responsible for giving the words 
“community organizing” the meaning they have today. Communities have long used 
social pressure as a way to inoculate themselves against real or imagined harms, but 
Alinsky took this age-old practice and made it an art form, or maybe even a science. He 
borrowed ideas from churches, labor unions, the settlement house movement, and 
organized crime to devise a series of rules that would make local activism more effective. 
To understand community organizing, one must understand Alinsky’s life. This chapter 
explains Alinsky’s influences and ideas. It then shows how these ideas helped shape the 
thinking of the founder and organizers of a community organizing group named Iowa 
Citizens for Community Improvement. Then it explores CCI’s early urban work and 
transition into rural organizing. Finally, it will examine the causes and impact of the 
farm crisis.  
Alinsky (1909-1972), the son of Russian Jewish immigrants, was a gregarious 
man with a sizeable ego, a penchant for bending the truth, and an implacable desire to 
obtain social justice for the powerless. Alinsky was a self-described radical who 
understood the importance of his reputation. Like other radicals before him, such as 
Mother Jones, in his lifetime he became an almost entirely fictional character, and he 
liked it that way.10 He made himself into a legendary man who fought for the 
                                                        
10
 Elliot J. Gorn, Mother Jones: The Most Dangerous Woman in America, (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2001). 
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downtrodden and caused trouble for the authorities everywhere he went. Time Magazine 
called him “a prophet of power to the people.”11 This status as a “prophet” or as the 
“dean of the community organizing” caused many people to dislike visits from Alinsky. 
As one of his biographers put it, he “became as welcome in most American cities as 
would Genghis Khan.”12 He did not mind criticism from the powerful because he 
thought it gave him more power with the poor and powerless.13  
  Alinsky was a product of early twentieth century Chicago. He was born just a 
few blocks south of the Hull-House settlement house.14 In 1889, Jane Addams and her 
colleagues started the Hull-House. By the time Alinsky was born twenty years later, it 
had become the most famous settlement house in the country. Settlement houses 
“provided structure and activities for large numbers of people…in poor neighborhoods,” 
with the goal of exposing “the poor to more middle-class values such as saving and 
character development.”15 Well-educated, middle class women thought that by 
establishing “settlements” in city centers they would not only expose the poor to what 
they saw as a higher way of life, but they also hoped to become more credible advocates 
by living in the poorest neighborhoods and experiencing the hardship for themselves. As 
Judith Trolander put it, settlement workers “not only had firsthand knowledge of the 
                                                        
11
 Robert Bruno, Review of the film The Democratic Promise: Saul Alinsky and His Legacy, Labor 
Studies Journal 29 (Summer 2004), 107-108. 
12
 P. David Finks, The Radical Vision of Saul Alinsky (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), viii. 
13
 “Mobilizing the Poor,” Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr., talkshow, directed by Al De Caprio, 
(1967; Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Video Library; 2010.) DVD.  
14
 Finks, Radical Vision, 3. 
15
 Wynetta Devore, “The House on Midland: From Inside Out,” in Community Organizing in a Diverse 
Society, ed. Felix G. Rivera and John L. Erlich, 62-74 (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1998). 
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situation but also had a right to complain” about social woes.16 Settlement workers 
sought to bring the poor into middle class society through education and cooperation, all 
the while acting as an interpreter for the poor to the middle class. Over time, as social 
work became a formalized field and social workers started to receive more education, 
fewer and fewer social workers actually lived in the settlement houses. The settlement 
movement was one of many Progressive Era reforms, but it peaked around 1920 and 
thereafter declined rapidly.17 
Saul Alinsky rejected the notion that middle class social workers who lived in 
low-income neighborhoods made credible spokespeople for the poor. Moreover, the 
poor did not need outside spokespeople. They needed power, and in Alinsky’s mind, 
power was not achievable through cooperation; conflict was the only means of obtaining 
power. The settlement houses sought to bring people into the middle class by changing 
the values and habits of the poor. Alinsky did not desire to change the poor themselves, 
but rather the amount of power the system allotted to them.18  
The Chicago School of Pragmatism also directly shaped Alinsky’s ideas. In the 
fall of 1927, Alinsky started at the University of Chicago. He took twenty-eight courses 
in sociology, and eight of the classes were with just three professors. Robert E. L. Faris, 
who had received his PhD under the tutelage of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, 
chaired the department and taught Alinsky in four classes. Alinsky took the other four 
classes with Robert Ezra Park and Ernest Watson Burgess. All three professors 
                                                        
16
 Judith Ann Trolander, “Social Change: Settlement Houses and Saul Alinsky, 1939-1965,” Social 
Service Review 56 (September 1982): 346-365. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 “Mobilizing the Poor,” Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr., talkshow, directed by Al De Caprio, 
(1967; Stanford; Hoover Institution Video Library; 2010.) DVD.  
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“mentored their students in firsthand empirical investigations of Chicago’s 
neighborhoods.”19 Burgess had a profound effect on the young man’s philosophical 
approach to social change. Burgess’s dissertation contains the foundations of Alinsky’s 
life work in a few simple lines. Burgess wrote, “with the realization of democracy in our 
present age it is now possible to reconstruct our social order” by the “harnessing of 
social forces.”20 The citizen “in so acting…realizes his best self.”21 Although these 
words were inspiring to the young Alinsky, most of his work at the University of 
Chicago focused on research. Alinsky had learned how to study and interpret the world 
in various ways, but he thought, as had others, that the point was to change it. 
As Saul Alinsky studied the neighborhoods of Chicago in 1927, organized crime 
was pervasive in the city. The St. Valentine’s Day massacre was still two years away, 
and Al Capone and his associates influenced nearly everything. Crime syndicates, which 
he compared to a “public utility,” fascinated Alinsky.22 He marveled at how they 
organized themselves and made the city work. Alinsky, like many Chicagoans, viewed 
members of the mafia as perfect antiheroes. They stood in opposition to those in charge, 
but they did so because those in charge unjustly denied people the freedom to do what 
they wanted. In the era of prohibition, Al Capone provided the people what they wanted, 
namely alcohol, and for that Capone was beloved (at least in 1927). Alinsky’s 
                                                        
19
 Lawrence J. Engel, “Saul D. Alinsky and the Chicago School,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
16 (2002): 50-66.  
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Donna Seaman, “How to be a Radical- Nicholas von Hoffman’s Radical: A Portrait of Saul Alinsky,” 
Booklist (June 1 & 15, 2010): 26. 
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fascination was not all-out admiration; he was well aware of the hardship organized 
crime inflicted on people.23 
Alinsky studied Capone’s operation for nearly two years and in that time learned 
many important lessons. One came from Frank Nitti, an “enforcer” and one of Capone’s 
top lieutenants. Nitti told him that he used out-of-town gunmen to kill people because it 
was difficult for many people to kill “a man from the old neighborhood, whom you saw 
at the ballgames and parties.”24 This taught Alinsky, “the terrible importance of personal 
relationships.”25 This anecdote, which Alinsky often told, appeared in at least four 
publications.26 There is no way to verify the accuracy of the account, but the mere fact 
that Alinsky chose to impart a lesson about personal relationships through a story about 
murder reveals a great deal about Alinsky and the public image he worked hard to craft. 
While the impact organized crime had on Alinsky as a political strategist and tactician is 
unclear, Alinsky’s desire to craft a Capone-like public image is much more certain.     
Perhaps the most important set of events in the history of community organizing 
took place in Chicago’s Back of the Yards neighborhood in the late thirties. The 
neighborhood consisted of ninety thousand people, mostly immigrants from Eastern 
Europe, and had been the made famous by Upton Sinclair in his 1906 novel The Jungle. 
The buildings were dilapidated, services were inconsistent, and disease and crime were 
                                                        
23
 When a member of Gang 42, which Alinsky had been studying, shot and killed a child during a robbery, 
Alinsky consoled the child’s grieving mother and brought her a “touch up” photo of the dead boy. It was 
the only photograph the mother had of her child. Finks, Radical Vision, 11. 
24
 Ibid, 8. 
25
 Ibid, 9. 
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 Ibid, 9; Marian K. Sanders, The Professional Radical: Conversations with Saul Alinsky (New York: 
Harper and Row, Perennial Library, 1970): 1920; Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great 
Depression (New York: Pantheon, 1970): 311; Eric Norden, “Saul Alinsky Interview,” Playboy (March 
1972): 60. 
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commonplace. This was the place where Saul Alinsky started his community organizing 
career. He quickly learned the importance of connecting with the local centers of 
influence, and in the Back of the Yards, this was the Catholic Church. Alinsky was not 
himself religious, but he spent the whole of his organizing career working very closely 
with religious institutions.27 It was at this time that Alinsky met his mentor and labor 
organizer John L. Lewis.28 Through this relationship, Alinsky learned many of the key 
ideas that guided the rest of his life’s work. He learned about power relationships, the 
importance of organization and practicality, and he came to understand the power of the 
right kind of reputation. This relationship brought the basic principles of labor 
organizing to community organizing.   
For nearly forty years, until his early death in 1972 at age 63, Saul Alinsky 
spread his gospel of community organizing across the country. He wrote two best selling 
books on the topic, trained numerous organizers including Cesar Chavez and Ed 
Chambers, and helped people establish organizations in several major cities.29 By the 
time of his death, there were enough community organizing groups that Alinsky’s ideas 
could continue to spread from one organizer to the next. Then, in 1974, Alinsky’s ideas 
spread to a priest from Iowa named Joe Fagan.  
                                                        
27
 Despite Alinsky’s close working relationship with the church, William F. Buckley joined others and 
accused Alinsky of being “anti-Christian.” After all, Alinsky starts Rules for Radicals with a quote that 
praises Lucifer and his rebellion against God. In response to Buckley’s charge, Alinsky said he was not 
anti-Christian but rather he had an aversion to “hypocrisy seasoned with sanctimoniousness.” “Mobilizing 
the Poor,” Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr., talkshow, directed by Al De Caprio, (1967; Stanford; 
Hoover Institution Video Library; 2010.) DVD.  
28
 Alinsky’s admiration for Lewis is illustrated in his 1949 biography of the labor leader. Saul Alinsky, 
“John L. Lewis: An Unauthorized Biography,” (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949). 
29
 Saul D. Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, (New York: Vintage Books, 1946); Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for 
Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Radicals, (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).  
 12
  Fagan attended training on community organizing in Chicago just two years 
after Alinsky’s death; he left committed to bringing Alinsky’s style of organizing to 
Iowa. The trainers had laid out the specific rules that guided community organizing and 
given plenty of concrete examples of how organizing could make a difference in the 
lives of the poor and powerless. Fagan’s previous efforts to affect social change now 
struck him as aimless and amateur. The training in Chicago showed the “science” of 
“real” community organizing.30 Alinsky’s model appeared to be practical and effective, 
but perhaps more importantly, it would be enjoyable. Fagan recalled thinking, “The 
whole world could be this… that sounded really fun.”31  
Upon returning to Waterloo, Iowa, Fagan set about starting a community 
organizing group. By 1975, Fagan and three other priests had raised enough money from 
eight parishes to start an organization they called Catholic Charities for Social Concerns. 
Fagan was the sole employee, and he worked alone out of a breezeway furnished simply 
with a space heater and desk. The nascent organization had no sign out front, no glossy 
literature, not even a phone. With a budget of just $6,200, Fagan limited his efforts to 
Waterloo. However, in a few years, he had expanded his funding sources, hired three 
new organizers, branched out to the other major cities in Iowa, and changed the group’s 
name to Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement.32  
                                                        
30
 Joe Fagan, personal interview, September 28. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Joe Fagan, personal interview, September 28 and October 3, 2011. I conducted interviews with seven 
people affiliated with CCI. I interviewed Joe Fagan at his home in Des Moines, Iowa. He provided me 
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September 19, 2011. I interviewed Hugh Espey at the CCI office in Des Moines, Iowa. He is the current 
Executive Director of CCI.    
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When asked why she spent her life settling issues by organizing rather than 
lawsuits, long time CCI member and Des Moines, Iowa, resident Brenda LaBlanc said, 
“Lawsuits are the rich person’s form of justice. If you’re poor, you have to organize.”33 
In the early years of CCI, Joe Fagan and his small staff did just that; they organized 
mostly poor and exclusively urban people in the larger cities across Iowa. They used the 
system laid out by Alinsky. Either community members came to CCI, or CCI organizers 
reached out to the community to identify a problem. CCI organizers then worked with 
the community to draft a list of demands. The next step entailed selecting the target, or 
the person who could grant the demands and therefore solve the problem. Once they had 
their target and demands, the community members asked to meet as a group with the 
target to present the demands. If the target granted the meeting and met the demands, the 
community could declare victory. However, if the target refused to meet with the group 
or refused to grant the demands, then the community changed its approach. At this point, 
the ingenuity of the community and the organizing group became crucial. People needed 
to devise new and creative ways to apply social pressure to the target or the entities the 
target had connections to, such as a church, business, or governmental body.  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), passed in 1977, which gave 
community members and groups like CCI a way to apply social pressure for those 
targets involved with banking.34 Congressional lawmakers intended the CRA “to 
encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in 
                                                        
33
 Brenda LaBlanc, personal interview, October 3, 2011. Brenda LaBlanc became active in CCI in 1978. I 
interviewed her at her home in Des Moines, Iowa. 
34
 Ibid; Hugh Espey, personal interview, September 19, 2011. 
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which they operate.”35 This legislation gave people an opportunity to weigh in on how 
banks conducted business in their communities. It allowed members of the public to 
challenge banks that had a branch or planned to move into their community. In the event 
that a bank appeared to be failing to meet the “credit needs of the communities in which 
they operate,” a citizen could file a complaint by simply adding the grievance to the 
bank’s CRA file that was required in all of the banks’ branch offices. Several federal 
agencies then reviewed these complaints. If a bank received too many complaints in 
their CRA file, it could potentially see its growth stifled as the federal agencies that 
approve mergers, acquisitions, and branching consider all CRA complaints. The CRA 
not only required more out of the banks in terms of meeting the community’s needs, it 
also gave the community some power over the banks. In the late seventies and early 
eighties, CCI used the CRA in urban areas to fight redlining and other forms of housing 
discrimination.36  
When CCI started working on rural issues, the farm crisis, according to some, 
had been underway for several years. The exact dates of the farm crisis are debatable, 
with some scholars, journalists, and authors dating it from the late 1970s to 1990 while 
others date it to include just its most destructive period, the first half of the 1980s.37 By 
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 Maintained by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, “Community Reinvestment Act,” 
last modified January 18, 2012, http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/ (accessed February 4, 2012).    
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 Joe Fagan, personal interview, September 28, 2011; “Redline,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, 
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Devine date the farm crisis as starting in the mid-late 1970s, while Barnett seems to offer a narrower focus 
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the time CCI brought their style of organizing to bear on the farm crisis in 1981, several 
other organizations were already attempting to address the plight of the rural community. 
For example, the American Agriculture Movement (AAM) formed in 1977 specifically 
to address rural issues. This new group started to work with older, more established farm 
groups such as the Farmers Union, which had worked on rural issues since its inception 
in 1902. Adding to the coalition were churches and unions. These groups came together 
under the name of The Iowa Farm Unity Coalition. However, this coalition lacked 
consistency, with the exact list of groups that were active changing on a regular basis. 
Several groups formed to wage various local fights but faded away after they ended. 
Churches and unions contributed in certain parts of Iowa depending on their membership. 
An organization named PrairieFire Rural Action joined the fight after forming in 1985.38               
 CCI frequently collaborated with several of these other organizations, which all 
worked to ameliorate the farm crisis. However, several factors led to a distance between 
CCI and the others. The organizational focus often differed enough between CCI and 
other organizations that they addressed different aspects of the farm crisis. For example, 
some organizations focused almost exclusively on counseling services, which was not 
part of CCI’s mission. Some people also viewed CCI as an urban organization that 
helped farmers on the side as opposed to a group like the Farmers Union, which focused 
exclusively on farmers. The main reason for organizational distance between CCI and 
the other groups was the confrontational nature of the Saul Alinsky style community 
                                                        
38
 Gilbert C. Fite, American Farmers: The New Minority (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1981), 38, 97-99, 209-217; “National Farmers Union: History,” accessed on October 10, 2011, 
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organizing that CCI practiced. Since many of the other organizations practiced a less 
combative form of activism that was typical of the times, especially in the Midwest, CCI 
often found it difficult to find other organizations that were willing to publicly 
collaborate with them. On the other hand, some people found the aggressive nature of 
CCI to be empowering.39 
Larry Ginter, a third generation farmer from Rhodes, Iowa, like many farmers, 
understood many of the causes of the farm crisis. Ginter saw the 1970s as a time of 
changing attitudes toward farming. He recalled a new, growing attitude that pressured 
farmers to farm “fence row to fence row,” which he saw as the motivation for some 
farmers to cut down trees and tear up waterways in order to plant more crops. This 
principle of expansion came from Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture under Richard 
Nixon and Gerald Ford, and it reflected a paradigm shift in federal agricultural policy. 
The previous paradigm, which had been in place since the New Deal, was based on the 
idea of limiting the amount of agricultural commodities that made it to market, with the 
goal of keeping crop prices high enough to keep the farmer in business and low enough 
for the consumer to afford. The new approach advocated producing as much as possible, 
which would inevitably flood the market and decrease crop prices, requiring the 
government to then prop up the crop prices with subsidies. These new policies of mass 
production were naturally more favorable for large-scale farmers and less favorable for 
the smaller family farms. Earl Butz traveled the country promoting his new policies and 
telling these smaller farmers, they had to “get big or get out” and “adapt or die.” By the 
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time Butz resigned as Secretary of Agriculture in late 1976, policies were in place that 
made farm consolidation almost inevitable. One historian has noted that “the [farm] 
crisis of the 1980s had its immediate roots in the inflationary, expansive, and optimistic 
1970s.” Butz helped plant those roots.40 
These policies drove up land prices along with crop prices, which ultimately laid 
the groundwork for the farm crisis. As Friedberger explained the situation: 
In the late 1970s, farm men and women on commercial operations were 
drawn into a cycle of deficit cash flow. Equity financing - the borrowing 
of money based on the collateral provided by the ever-increasing values 
of land - was a rational and legitimate strategy for them as long as 
inflation continued to push land values ever higher. Lenders were very 
willing to finance expansion so long as the inflationary spiral continued.41 
In sum, farmers were able to borrow practically as much as they wanted, since they had 
a strong income and their valuable land for collateral. Farmers accumulated massive 
amounts of debt to buy newer and larger equipment and as much land as possible. Then, 
crop prices started to fall. By 1978, corn was $1.75 per bushel below the cost of 
production. In 1979, the Federal Reserve reversed their monetary policy by raising 
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interest rates, which “had tremendous and largely unforeseen ramifications for all sectors 
of the nation’s economy.”42 Real interest rates, or the rate at which interest exceeded 
inflation, rose to as much as 8-10 percent. This not only directly increased the cost 
farmers had to pay to borrow money, but it also made the dollar weaker relative to 
foreign currencies, which weakened exports. Then, by the early 1980s, the bottom fell 
out of land prices. Throughout the course of the 1980s, “the decline in average land 
values ranged from 39.6 percent to 40.0 percent.”43  
 This confluence of economic forces left farmers with little income and massive 
debt. To make matters worse, the collateral used to back their debt, their land, 
depreciated significantly. This made it difficult for farmers to get access to new credit, 
which they increasingly depended on as crop prices dropped. It also became challenging 
to renegotiate existing loans, with any refinancing resulting in an increase in interest 
rates. Nervous bankers became less flexible with their farming customers and eventually 
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started calling the loans due. The number of farm bankruptcies and foreclosures started 
to rise.44 
The farm crisis became so unbearable that some committed horrible acts of 
violence. On December 9, 1985, Dale Burr, a third-generation crop farmer from Johnson 
County, Iowa, walked into the Hills Bank & Trust Company and shot his banker, John 
Hughes, in the head with a twelve-gauge shotgun. Burr had done the same to his wife, 
Emily, before traveling to the bank. After leaving the bank, he shot and killed his fellow 
farmer, Richard Goody, and then he shot himself.45 Burr had owned a “successful 
farming and farm chemical business,” but by the mid-eighties, things started falling apart 
for him.46 His brother-in-law estimated that he had accumulated nearly a million dollars 
in debt, he fell behind on his taxes, and tried to bail out his son who had made some 
“questionable [farm] investments.” Just before the shooting, Emily Burr reportedly said, 
“I’m 64 years old and for the first time in my life I don’t have money for groceries.”47 
People knew about the Burrs’ financial trouble and in some sense, some people could 
understand why Dale did what he did. Jerry Wormer, the Hills general store manager, 
said, “[Dale] was a proud man, once successful, whose problems had become common 
knowledge. Maybe he’s better off now.”48 
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 What happened with Dale Burr and his victims, what happened to Hills, Iowa, 
happened in other small towns across the Midwest as well. In 1983, in Ruthton, 
Minnesota, James Jenkins and his son Steve ambushed Rudy Blythe, their banker, and 
Toby Thulin, a loan officer, at their defaulted-on dairy farm. The Jenkins boys used their 
30-caliber rifle to shoot Thulin through the throat before shooting Blythe five times, 
killing them both. After the murders, the Jenkins fled to Texas, where James shot 
himself. Similarly, in 1986, in Elk Point, South Dakota, the stress of the bad farm 
economy drove Bruce Litchfield to murder his wife, his thirteen-year-old daughter, and 
his nine-year-old son, before he turned the gun on himself. Litchfield worked for the 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), the federal government’s lender of last resort 
for farmers, and after the moratorium on foreclosures ended, he faced the possibility of 
having to foreclose on a large number of farmers who were also personal friends.49  
These murder-suicides captured the headlines during the 1980s, but in many 
cases, similar types of tragedies were not widely discussed. Out of respect to the families, 
many suicides did not make the front page, leaving the obituaries short on details and 
peppered with euphemisms. Research from just five midwestern states conducted by the 
National Farm Medicine Center and the Minnesota Center for Health Statistics compiled 
in the early 1990s showed that 913 male farmers killed themselves in the 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 1988, 71 female farmers, 96 farm children, and 177 farm workers 
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committed suicide. These suicide rates far exceeded the national average. In the case of 
the male farmers, suicide rates peaked at 187 percent of their non-farming counterparts. 
The increase in farmer suicides and the high profile murders are a clear illustration of the 
desperation many farmers felt during the farm crisis of the 1980s.50  
CCI organizers understood that this desperation resulted from a lack of power. 
As they saw it, farmers and rural residents of Iowa were suffering because of decisions 
often made by corporate leaders and government officials far removed from the daily 
lives of Midwesterners, just as the immigrants in the Back of the Yards neighborhood 
suffered at the hands of the meatpacking plant owners. For the duration of the farm crisis, 
CCI would continue to implement Alinsky’s ideas and approach to social reform 
throughout the state of Iowa. Just as Alinsky rejected the settlement house idea of the 
poor being poor because they did not have the proper middle class values, CCI 
organizers rejected the idea that African Americans who faced housing discrimination or 
farmers who, after a lifetime of successful farming, suddenly found themselves facing 
foreclosure, were to blame in any way. They placed the blame squarely on the shoulders 
of the bankers and government officials who changed the environment in a way that 
resulted in redlining and the farm crisis. With this blame came all of the public shame 
and pressure CCI could muster.  
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In order to be a more effective agent of public pressure, CCI organizers again 
emulated Alinsky. They developed a reputation for being extremely aggressive, 
unconventional, and, to many people, unacceptably rude. By protesting at a banker’s 
personal residence to protest that banker decisions – in front of their children and 
neighbors – CCI sent a powerful message not only to the banker they were protesting, 
but also to any bankers who heard about the protest. If an organizing visit from Joe 
Fagan had been compared to a visit from Genghis Khan, Joe Fagan would have been 
very pleased.  
With a focus on conflict instead of compromise, CCI may have distanced itself 
from many groups and individuals who disagreed with those tactics. Nevertheless, the 
group continued to grow in strength, numbers, and influence. They would continue to do 
so throughout the farm crisis and the more than twenty years since. This approach 
provides the organization with a niche that appeals to an activist segment of the 
population. It can also be extremely effective at bringing about change in certain 
circumstances. However, it can also be extremely limiting. Many organizations cannot 
or will not change their policies to please the loud demands of a small portion of the 
population. These limitations did not deter CCI organizers from fighting and winning 
several important victories during the farm crisis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ORGANIZING IN THE EXODUS 
 
 
 In 1981, CCI started its rural organizing in Mount Ayr, Iowa. Local farmers, Bob 
Andrews and his brother Bill, as well as Herb and Vivian Jackson, invited Joe Fagan to 
come to Ringgold County and help organize the people. Fagan spent a couple of days 
traveling around the countryside and meeting with the residents in an attempt to gain an 
understanding of the issues. Then, Fagan arranged for a meeting in the town’s small 
Presbyterian church. Seventy people showed up, discussed the situation, and decided 
they needed to hold a meeting with a representative of the Small Business 
Administration (SBA). The SBA agreed to meet, and one hundred and thirty people 
showed up to air their grievances and demand relief.51 The SBA had done nothing wrong 
per se; they operated under the same rules as they always had, but the farmers’ situation 
had changed considerably. With the increase in interest rates, the cost of running a farm 
rose substantially, while the value of the land that the farmer used for collateral to obtain 
operating loans had plummeted. The residents of Mount Ayr met with the Small 
Business Administration with the hope of convincing, or forcing, the SBA to make 
capital more available for farmers. Pressuring government entities and private banks to 
reduce or write off interest rates or existing balances or take any other actions that would 
keep farmers from losing their homes or farms would become a mainstay of CCI for the 
next decade.  
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 Although this foray into rural organizing demonstrated that farmers and rural 
residents were ready to take action, CCI did not commit a fulltime staff person to the 
farm crisis until 1984. Both Joe Fagan and Hugh Espey, the first fulltime rural organizer, 
remembered the primary reason for not working on these issues fulltime was a lack of 
funding. As Fagan put it, “Nobody was funding this kind of work. A few people were 
funding organizing around urban issues, but nobody was funding rural work. They didn’t 
care about that.”52 Groups involved in the farm crisis struggled to find funding. As a new, 
primarily urban-based group, CCI found it especially difficult to find funding for rural 
organizing, especially at a time when the Midwest saw a growing number of farm-
focused groups form. Some groups, like PrairieFire, whose Executive Director was a 
United Methodist Minister, had indirect affiliations with churches, and therefore church 
funding. Other groups, like Catholic Rural Life, were directly part of a church. These 
groups had a reasonably reliable income source. American Agricultural Movement 
(AAM), Farmers Union, CCI, and many other groups competed for what little grant 
money or personal donations were available. Funding sources eventually started to 
appear as more and more people began to get involved. According to one study, as many 
as sixty percent of farmers attended a “crisis meeting” during the 1980s, while nearly a 
quarter described themselves as “activists.”53   
 By the end of 1984, CCI organizers had secured adequate funding and began its 
fulltime rural organizing operation. This chapter will explore the three main rural 
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campaigns waged by CCI organizers from 1985 to 1990. Their first campaign focused 
on addressing falling crop prices by seeking legislation that would ensure a minimum 
price. After that, they worked to negotiate credit issues with federal agencies. Their other 
major effort consisted of working with private banks to address the credit needs of 
farmers. In this campaign, they utilized the same legal rights, namely, those provided by 
the CRA, and tactics they had employed in fights with banks concerning urban credit 
issues.54 This chapter argues that although the tactics changed from campaign to 
campaign, the underlying principle of direct conflict remained the same. Furthermore, all 
actions that appeared to be similar to a social service, such as the service provided 
during the farm credit days, were services that resulted from confrontational organizing. 
They also had the added benefit of bringing more people into the organization, which 
helped build CCI’s power.55 
Once CCI started rural organizing full time, staff members immediately 
advocated for passage of a minimum price bill. This bill called for a “minimum price for 
most commodities at 80 percent of parity,” in other words, an amount “roughly 
equivalent to the production cost.”56 Burt Henningson, an agricultural economist from 
the University of Minnesota at Morris and a supporter of the bill, said, “Minimum 
pricing is like minimum wage.”57 The bill had a provision that prohibited the minimum 
pricing from taking effect unless similar legislation passed in other agricultural states, 
which in conjunction covered at least sixty percent of a given commodity market. 
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According to its supporters, the minimum price bill would have raised the price of corn 
and soybeans considerably, as they were selling for fifty-nine and fifty percent of parity 
respectively in February of 1985. These rates were untenable for most farmers. Virginia 
Genzen, a farmer from Crawford County, Iowa, told the Iowa Farmer Today that, “We 
are producing food for the United States without a wage. In Lincoln’s day they called 
that slavery.”58 If the bill passed into law, anyone who purchased or sold a commodity at 
less than eighty percent of parity would be subject to penalty, which would virtually 
guarantee the farmer a fair price for his or her crop. In addition, the bill would not 
require any allocation of state funds.59  
 CCI organizers traveled the state, holding informational meetings and gathering 
support for the proposed legislation. In four months, they held more than forty meetings 
across the state at churches, homes, community buildings, co-ops, and the State Capitol. 
CCI also organized a protest at the Farm Bureau’s state headquarters in West Des 
Moines in March of 1985, at which forty farmers participated. The Farm Bureau 
adamantly opposed the minimum price bill and was the most powerful lobby that CCI 
confronted. Many of the farmers who protested Farm Bureau were lifelong Farm Bureau 
members who were upset at the organization’s opposition to a bill they strongly 
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supported. The rest of the meetings were less confrontational and saw similar turnouts. 
In Clutier, thirty people met at the grain elevator. In Dunlap, fifty people met at the 
Catholic Church. In Des Moines, one hundred and fifty people joined in a march 
downtown. People were turning out to meetings consistently across the state, writing 
letters to newspaper editors, and contacting their elected officials. These efforts kept 
pressure on legislators and ensured the bill became part of the public debate. However, 
the decisive event that moved the bill forward happened on February 27, 1985, in Ames, 
Iowa, where 15,000 “angry and frustrated” farmers and their allies gathered for the 
National Farm Crisis Action Rally.60 Ten farm organizations collaborated to organize the 
rally. Iowa State University’s Hilton Coliseum reached capacity, and with all 14,800 
seats filled in the arena, hundreds of people ended up gathering outside on the steps 
listening to the speeches over loud speakers. As Joe Fagan remembered it, most of the 
legislators attended, since the State Assembly canceled all legislative activities in order 
to support the event. The rally demonstrated such an arresting show of rural 
dissatisfaction that within a week, the Iowa Senate passed the bill by a vote of 29-19; a 
few days later it passed the House by a vote of 55-43.61       
 Supporters celebrated these victories but knew it would be difficult to get 
Governor Terry Branstad to sign the legislation. On March 20, 1985, CCI held a rally at 
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the State Capitol to show support for the bill and meet with the Governor in an attempt 
to persuade him to sign it. More than two hundred people showed up in Des Moines. 
Several of the leaders met with Branstad immediately following the rally but could not 
get him to commit to signing the bill. They decided to stay at the Capitol and hold a vigil 
until he did. A few days later, Branstad vetoed the bill. He cited a study from Iowa State 
University that claimed, “Iowa could lose 86,000 jobs and $6.7 billion in economic 
activity.”62 He also said, “I am concerned that signing this legislation would take the 
pressure off Washington to act to address our agricultural problems…instead we need to 
redouble our efforts to demand changes in national farm policy.”63 Many farmers were 
far less optimistic about the possibility of the Reagan administration intervening in the 
situation.64  
 Most of the tactics that CCI used during the minimum wage bill fight were 
typical of any sort of social or political organization. Making phone calls to legislators, 
sending letters to the editor, holding meetings, and giving speeches are all part of 
political organizing. Some people considered CCI’s rhetoric and protesting of the Farm 
Bureau too confrontational; others thought that the severity of the situation demanded 
drastic actions. Very few who knew about CCI were indifferent to the organization. 
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Some of the tactics CCI used also differentiated it from the rest of the organizations. Joe 
Fagan remembered one of these tactics as being a lot of fun. One night, in the middle of 
the minimum price bill campaign, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Fagan and Hugh Espey 
went into the State Capitol, which remained unlocked at all times. They were entirely 
alone in the building, as it was several hours past the close of business. Fagan found a 
“fact sheet” that the Republicans circulated among their caucus to inform their members 
about arguments that could be used against the minimum pricing bill.65 He then sat down 
and “corrected” the sheet, replacing their numbers with CCI numbers and answering the 
questions that the paper presented as unanswerable.66 Fagan then walked over to the 
copy machine, made a sufficient number of copies, and distributed the revised version of 
the “fact sheet” to each of the legislators’ desks.67        
CCI’s opponents and would-be supporters were not surprised by the 
organization’s unconventional tactics, especially given the radical nature of the 
minimum pricing bill. To many people, including agricultural economists Arne Paulsen 
and William H. Meyers at Iowa State University, the minimum pricing bill was an 
entirely impractical, hare-brained scheme that would destroy the economy of any state 
that tried it.68 Since the bill only required the states that accounted for sixty percent of 
any given commodity's production and commodities traded at a national level, the states 
that passed the bill would price themselves out of the market. The remaining forty 
percent would be able to sell their products considerably cheaper and ultimately 
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dominate the market. If the bill passed at the federal level, the entire country would price 
itself out of the global market. Given the seemingly obvious economic problems with the 
bill, why did CCI support it? There are several answers to this question. For one thing, 
economists in general frequently made mistakes. Earl Butz was an economist himself, 
yet his decisions were in part to blame for the farm crisis. Beyond this general 
skepticism, CCI members were especially weary of economists and policy advocates 
that were associated with land grant universities like Iowa State University. Given the 
financial connections between large agribusiness corporations and land grant universities, 
reports issued by one were viewed as the same as a report issued by the other. In the eyes 
of CCI members and organizers, what was good for Monsanto was not good for the 
family farmer. Indeed, many CCI members viewed the desires of agribusiness as 
completely antithetical to their own. Finally, the economic opinion of the bill was not 
unanimous. An economist named Bert Henningson from the University of Minnesota 
supported the bill and argued that it was economically sound. He stood in agreement 
with CCI on many things and in December of 1985, CCI brought Henningson to Iowa 
State University for a protest and meeting. During the meeting: 
Henningson pointed to a list posted on one wall of the meeting room 
containing the names of corporate contributors to Iowa State and the 
amounts contributed. “Look at who funds the ag economics department at 
Iowa State,” Henningson said. “It’s the chemical companies and seed 
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companies…they’re not in it for (the betterment) of farming, they’re in it 
for themselves.”69   
 The 1985 minimum price bill campaign proved to be the most intensive, though 
not the only, legislative fight CCI had in the latter half of the 1980s. They unsuccessfully 
tried to push the same legislation through the next year. Despite the continued meetings, 
rallies, and constant political pressure from CCI members and other supporters of the bill 
that lasted the better part of a year, the bill did not make it out of committee. From the 
very beginning of the legislative session, many legislators doubted the viability of the 
bill passing in 1986, since Governor Branstad had given no sign that he had changed his 
mind about the legislation. In 1987, Branstad also came into conflict with CCI when he 
vetoed a bill that contained funding for several farm programs that would have provided 
legal services and reduced interest rates for farmers. Federal legislators also heard from 
CCI members who called for the “transfer of $581 million from the Pentagon’s budget to 
Iowa’s Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loan program.”70 These smaller lobbying 
efforts did not yield many tangible results. They did, however, serve to keep the 
concerns of CCI members in the public spotlight.71  
The largest concerns desperate farmers had in the late 1980s, next to low crop 
prices, had to do with credit availability and interest rates. In accordance with this, CCI 
directed its efforts largely at two main government-affiliated entities. The first was a 
federal agency by the name of Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), which offered 
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credit to farmers who could not get credit from other institutions. The second was Farm 
Credit Services (FCS), which was a government-controlled corporation as established by 
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.72 
 CCI members and farmers across the state had several demands for the FmHA. 
They wanted a complete moratorium foreclosures on all FmHA farm loans, an 
acceleration of the loan process, an increase in funding made available to Iowa’s FmHA 
offices, and an increase in the number of people who could participate in an interest rate 
buy-down program. CCI organizers traversed the state, meeting with groups of twenty to 
one hundred and fifty people in dozens of small towns. They held meetings to educate 
the public about their options, but they also held meetings with legislators and FmHA 
employees to tell them what the public needed. Many people who attended CCI 
meetings did so because they wanted to see large institutional reforms, but others 
attended with hopes of finding a solution to their personal financial problems.73   
 CCI helped farmers address their financial needs by holding meetings across the 
state, which they called “farm credit days.” These meetings consisted of FmHA 
employees setting up ad hoc offices at the site of the meeting and working with farmers 
directly to secure more credit or renegotiate existing loans. These types of meetings were 
a result of a relentless pressure campaign on Iowa Farmers Home Administration 
Director Bob Pim. In February of 1985, CCI filled the Director’s office in Des Moines 
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with a list of demands. Over the next several years, CCI invited him to meetings where 
even more farmers could pressure him to change the FmHA. Most of these meetings 
ended with individual farmers cornering Pim and pleading their cases to him directly. 
Eventually, the Director agreed to a series of farm credit days. Pim made a revealing 
statement to the Council Bluffs Nonpareil newspaper when he said, “My experience 
with public meetings is that they turn out to be a roast of the FmHA. Don’t give me 
meetings, give me cases so I can help people.”74 CCI members could have viewed Pim’s 
comments as the very definition of victory. Officials at the FmHA tried to help more 
farmers in an explicit attempt to avoid pressure from CCI.75  
 When the Farm Credit Act of 1987 passed, billions of dollars of farm loans came 
under the control of Farm Credit Services (FCS). CCI started to run ads and hold 
meetings to ascertain information about farmers’ experiences with the FCS. By 1989, 
they had received numerous complaints about the FCS office in Mason City, Iowa. As 
Espey put it in an interview with The Agri-News, “When you find a pocket where farmer 
after farmer after farmer has similar complaints, there must be something to it – not that 
many farmers can be wrong. Where there’s smoke, there’s fire.”76 Jerry and Agnes 
Franks were one of the farm couples that struggled with the FCS. In 1979, the Franks 
had taken out a loan that they understood to be a fixed interest loan, but it actually had a 
variable interest rate. When interest rates rose, the bank foreclosed on the Franks after 
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they fell behind on their payments. The Franks sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and 
won, only to have their case overturned because it exceeded the statute of limitation. The 
FCS set a date for the sheriff’s sale. In response, CCI organized a group of supporters to 
go into the Mason City FCS branch with a simple request to wait until the Franks 
completed the appeal process. Employing the usual pressure tactics against the FCS, CCI 
members called and wrote them constantly. In the end, however, despite all of the 
community support, the Franks lost their appeal and ultimately lost their farm as well.77   
 CCI attempted to change how private banks treated farmers in their third major 
campaign in the late 1980s. It used a wide variety of tactics and pressured a large 
number of banks to make additional credit available to farmers and allow more farmers 
to work out an arrangement with their loans that worked for the bank as well as the 
farmers. CCI focused a large portion of its efforts on ensuring banks followed the 
requirements of the CRA. CCI utilized the features of the act to convince a large number 
of banks to change how they treated farmers. Norwest Bank proved to be the most 
difficult bank to challenge, but in the end served as the largest victory for CCI on this 
front.78 
 In January of 1987, CCI organizers held a meeting in Humboldt, Iowa to talk to 
members about how they could force rural banks like Norwest Bank to comply with the 
CRA by meeting the credit needs of the rural community. This was a relatively novel 
idea. People viewed and used the CRA exclusively as a law pertaining to urban banks 
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even though the law contained no such limitation. Throughout the spring and summer, 
CCI organizers and members continued to discuss bringing their experience with the 
CRA into their work with farmers. They developed a team of community leaders who 
would become experts in the CRA called the Farm Task Force. Then in August, they 
saw their chance to act when a newspaper ran an article about Norwest Bank’s attempts 
to buy Peoples Bank in Cedar Rapids.79  
 CCI started to investigate Norwest and put together a list of demands. Farmers 
and other CCI members had difficulties dealing with Norwest, and the more they asked 
around, the more stories CCI staffers heard. There were also media stories at that time 
about Norwest losing a lot of money on foreign loans. Espey looked into Norwest’s 
FDIC filings to determine “changes in volume of Norwest farm loans, government 
securities, deposits, assets and total loans between December 1984 and December 
1986.”80 After gaining a better understanding of the situation, CCI organizers and the 
Farm Task Force developed a list of demands for Norwest Bank. They proposed, “$54 
million of operating and real estate loans targeted to family farmers, loans for beginning 
farmers, participation in interest buy down loans, debt restructuring, a signed statement, 
a review board, [and] marketing and renewal provisions.”81 
 In November of 1987, CCI met with Norwest Regional President George 
Milligan and a few top agricultural loan officials. CCI presented Milligan and his staff 
the demands, but they did not agree to anything. Instead, they promised to review, 
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consider the demands, and meet to talk about their response on a later date. However, it 
became clear within a few months that Norwest did not intend to meet with CCI again. 
Nor did they plan to freely agree to the demands.82  
 Since Norwest refused to negotiate or to even meet with CCI members and staff, 
CCI started to apply pressure using a variety of approaches. They got the story into the 
media and they started to fill Norwest’s CRA file with every correspondence between 
the two groups. Since the CRA file is reviewed by the FDIC, which approves or denies 
attempts by banks to acquire other banks, and since the correspondence consisted of a 
series of requests by the community to discuss credit needs followed by Norwest’s 
refusal to meet with them, the CRA file served as a running record of how Norwest 
failed to comply with the Community Reinvestment Act. CCI then filed an official 
grievance with the Federal Reserve Bank in an attempt to stop Norwest’s acquisition of 
Peoples Bank. CCI also engaged in direct actions, which consists of a direct public 
confrontation with the target. One of these direct actions took place at Milligan’s home 
in January of 1988. CCI organizers and community members blanketed his 
neighborhood with literature explaining the situation and asking people to tell Milligan 
to meet with CCI. Additionally, they sent letters to the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) 
asking them to meet with CCI and Norwest at the same time in order to negotiate a 
deal.83 
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 In March of 1988, the FRB and Norwest met with CCI, AAM, and Catholic 
Rural Life. Norwest refused to agree to the demands again. Immediately following the 
meeting, organizers and community members returned to Milligan’s house to protest, in 
direct violation of the request sent by Milligan’s lawyer not to do so. They also took 
flyers to Norwest Bank’s competitors explicitly explaining what Norwest did to warrant 
the public’s ire and implicitly warning the other banks about what would happen if they 
did the same. They continued to call for meetings with Milligan and later his 
replacement, John Nelson. Norwest officials told them to meet with local branches, 
which they did. CCI organizers brought more allies into the fight and the campaign 
widened. They convinced the United Methodist Church and the bishop of the Sioux City 
diocese to join the campaign. Then Norwest applied to build a bank branch in Lincoln, 
Nebraska. CCI filed another protest with the FRB. A month later, the FRB, which had 
previously approved Norwest’s acquisition of the Cedar Rapids bank, granted CCI’s 
appeal of that ruling. This halted all further progress on the purchase.84 
 Nelson knew that he would have to do something to accommodate the demands 
of CCI and its allies. He called Joe Fagan on August 5, 1988, and said, “Let’s meet.”85 
“That’s when we knew we had him,” Fagan recalled years later.86 Nelson met with the 
Farm Task Force a few weeks later, but this time he eagerly negotiated. He said at one 
point during the meeting, “When you (CCI) go away mad, bad things happen.”87 The 
leadership of Norwest Bank and the CCI Farm Task Force met to negotiate five times in 
                                                        
84
 Joe Fagan, personal interview, September 28, 2011; Joe Fagan, “Campaign to Obtain Credit from 
Norwest Bank,” archives of Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement, Des Moines, IA.  
85
 Joe Fagan, personal interview, September 28, 2011. 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 Ibid. 
 38
a five-month period, and on the final day of negotiation in January of 1989, they reached 
an agreement. Norwest Bank would commit eighteen million dollars in new loans and 
fourteen million to “farmers owing less than 500 acres and having a net worth of less 
than $150,000.”88  
 The Norwest agreement was a major victory for CCI, their allies, and people 
across Iowa, especially small family farmers, but it was not the only banking deal 
reached at that time. In November of 1988, CCI reached agreement with Banks of Iowa 
to guarantee five million dollars in low-interest loans to small farmers. The loans would 
be four percent lower than those available through the FmHA. This would be “an 
opportunity to keep this land in the hands of family farmers,” Jerry Streit, a West Bend 
farmer, said about the program.89 Rodney Schroeter, a farmer from Brayton, also 
supported the agreement. He said, “It won’t save everybody, but it’ll be a help to an 
awful lot of them.”90 
 The above comment by Rodney Schroeter referred to the loan agreement reached 
between CCI and Banks of Iowa, but he could have just as easily been referring to Iowa 
Citizens for Community Improvement’s role in the farm crisis more broadly. CCI had 
many victories between 1985 and 1990 but also suffered a number of serious setbacks. 
Its first major campaign to pass legislation at the state level that would have guaranteed 
farmers a minimum price for their crops did not ultimately become law. CCI pushed the 
bill through both the Senate and the House of Representatives, but in the end, that did 
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not change anything for the struggling farmer. The fight proved to be a useful one, 
though, for many reasons. CCI and coalition partners showed that they were a political 
force that had to be dealt with as they were able to apply sufficient public pressure and 
offer a compelling enough reform proposal that their legislation made it to the 
Governor’s desk. Additionally, the campaign to support the bill required CCI organizers 
and members to travel the state, which allowed them to meet with hundreds of farmers 
and rural citizens, learn more about the dynamics of the farm crisis, and establish a 
greater network of members and supporters in towns across the state. The minimum 
price bill campaign ended in defeat, but in the process of fighting it, CCI became one of 
the leading rural issue community groups.  
 The campaign to renegotiate loans and open up more credit for farmers with 
federal agencies yielded tangible victories. CCI publicly criticized Farmers Home 
Administration and Farm Credit Services, calling for a large number of significant 
changes in how they operated. Most of these changes did not occur. Some of the changes 
CCI asked the agency directors to make were not even within the directors’ authority, 
such as the amount of funding the agency had. These types of public criticism of 
government entities derived from the old adage, “The squeaky wheel gets the grease.” If 
politicians continuously read about these common complaints in the paper, they would 
be more likely address the problem. The direct victories in this campaign came from the 
Farm Credit Days. These days of direct negotiations allowed farmers who faced difficult 
financial situations to meet with FmHA or FCS officials who could modify their loans. 
These negotiations did not occur in government office buildings in Des Moines, but 
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rather small towns across the state where the community and advocates trained in loan 
negotiations could easily support the farmers. All of these factors made the Farm Credit 
Days a success. Hugh Espey estimated that the Farm Credit Days protected dozens of 
farmers from losing their farms. That the Farm Credit Days occurred at all is a testament 
to the efficacy of CCIs confrontational approach. As Pim’s comment suggested, it was 
better for CCI’s target to sit down and work things out with a farmer than face the ire of 
CCI members.91    
 The final major organizing campaign at this time revolved around credit and 
private banks, which resulted in the clearest and most wide-ranging victories CCI had 
during this time. After years of consistent pressure and inventive tactics, CCI negotiated 
a massive deal with Norwest bank that allowed people, and specifically small farmers, 
access to tens of millions of dollars in low interest loans. Since CCI reached a five 
million dollar deal with Banks of Iowa, more farmers in more locations were able to 
have access to similar financing. This too was directly attributable to CCI’s commitment 
to conflict. As Nelson said when he agreed to make the deal with CCI, he wanted to 
avoid the “bad things” that happened when CCI went “away mad.”92  
 These three campaigns yielded impressive results for a small organization with 
relatively little funding, but the underlying causes of the farm crisis remained. The 
federal policies supporting mass production, the improvements in technologies that 
allowed fewer farmers to farm more ground, ever-increasing input cost, and increased 
global competition were all factors that contributed to the farm crisis of the 1980s. CCI 
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did not and could not affect any of these factors. Ultimately, the farm crisis wiped out 
many farm families and farming communities, and by the 1990s, farming had started a 
new era defined by large-scale industrial factory farms and massive crop operations. 
Increasingly, national or international corporations owned part or all of the farming 
operation, turning many independent farmers into corporate employees.  
 The farm crisis drastically altered the state of Iowa. The total number of farms 
decreased significantly. Between 1975 and 1990, the number of farms in Iowa declined 
by 20 percent, with one county seeing a loss of 27.3 percent. The population also 
decreased. During the 1980s, the total population reduced by nearly 4.7 percent, from 
2,913,808 to 2,776,755. Almost all of this depopulation occurred in rural parts of the 
state, where the population decreased by 137,053 or 11.37 percent. By contrast, the 
urban areas only saw a decrease of 6,436 or 0.5 percent.93  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE NEW FACE OF ORGANIZING 
 
 
 
While the state of Iowa and the agricultural sector of the U.S. was starting to 
settle into a new normal, farmers in Mexico were on the verge of their own farm crisis. 
This crisis would result in the migration of a large number of Mexicans to the U.S., 
many of whom settled in Iowa. These immigrants often lacked the legal documentation 
to be in the United States and faced many social, economic, and legal hardships. 
Eventually, CCI started to organize in Iowa’s growing Latino community. This chapter 
examines the effects that the North American Free Trade Agree (NAFTA) had on the 
Mexican economy and how that accounts for a considerable portion of the Latino 
population that started to settle in Iowa during the 1990s and 2000s. It will also look at 
one community that included a sizeable Mexican immigrant population, Marshalltown, 
and why that town embraced the new immigrants. Then, I examine the meatpacking 
industry, which employs a large number of immigrants under often-brutal conditions. 
After providing this background, the chapter explores four major campaigns undertaken 
by CCI and relating to the Latino community. First, CCI tried to engage the community 
by attempting various forms of non-organizing outreach. Second, CCI organized 
meatpacking industry workers against their ineffective corporate union. Third, CCI 
helped members of the Marshalltown community respond and fight for change after an 
immigration raid radically disrupted the community. Fourth, CCI worked with people 
from across the state and nation after another immigration raid took place in Postville, 
 44
Iowa. I argue that at time CCI worked on issues and events that were non-
confrontational, but these events were, as with the Farm Credit Days, designed to build 
membership and therefore power.   
Economic instability was a perennial feature of the Mexican economy, and the 
farming sector had always struggled. The country had faced three separate crises in less 
than ten years. Due to slow economic growth and heavy debt loads, the markets 
devalued the peso in 1976, 1982, and 1985. This resulted in a capital flight and a further 
deterioration of the overall economy.95 Things were particularly bad for Mexico’s rural 
residents. In 1984, twelve percent of them lived in extreme poverty.96 Many farmers 
worked on ejidos, which are communal farms located on government lands first 
established after the 1917 revolution. In the late 1980s, fifty-nine percent of those who 
worked on ejidos were subsistence farmers.97 Further, 38 percent of all corn produced 
was not sent to market, but instead consumed by the producer.98  
 With a desire to bring greater economic stability and increase the overall 
standard of living, Mexican leaders in the Carlos Salinas de Gortari Administration 
started pushing for the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1991. The idea was 
simple and the hopes were high. If Mexico, the United States, and Canada all agreed to 
drop their tariffs, each country would maximize their comparative advantage and prosper. 
Mexico had a comparative advantage in its labor costs and expected to be able to create 
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a large number of high paying jobs (relative to Mexican standards) primarily in the 
manufacturing sector, but also in the production of labor-intensive fruits and 
vegetables.99 On the other hand, the U.S. would have a comparative advantage in the 
production of capital-intensive products such as “grains, oil seed, and meat.”100 Most 
free trade agreements exempted agriculture, but its proponents intended NAFTA to be 
ambitious, covering all sectors and creating a free trade zone that would have the “same 
magnitude as the European Union.”101 Many in the Mexican government thought that 
NAFTA would stabilize their economy and start to reverse the growth in the poverty 
rate.102 They also knew it would destroy the Mexican agricultural sector as it was then 
constituted. They believed this was an acceptable tradeoff for two reasons. First, 
policymakers did not view the agricultural sector as productive. If subsistence farmers 
became well-paid factory workers, the GDP would grow, benefiting the society as a 
whole. Second, with effective public policy implemented over time, farmers could 
transition within the new economy with limited social unrest.103 
To this end, the NAFTA agreements allowed for a periodic drop in tariff rates. 
During this transition period, the Mexican government intended to do several 
challenging things. Government officials wanted to “keep [farmers] down on the farm as 
long as possible,” “use this time to create alternative job opportunities,” “increase 
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expenditures on social concerns,” “decentralize centers of economic opportunity in rural 
areas,” and “maintain a high level of overall economic growth.”104 Unfortunately, the 
government met almost none of these objectives. In the end, the implementation of 
NAFTA, along with several other key factors, devastated Mexico’s rural population.  
 The years that followed the 1994 passage of NAFTA saw the destruction of 
Mexico’s farming economy. The total number of people employed in the agricultural 
sector dropped from 8.1 million in 1993 to 6.8 million in 2003.105 The value added by 
Mexican agriculture also decreased from $32 billion to $25 billion over the same 
period.106 The number of pork producers dropped precipitously. Before NAFTA, 15,000 
Mexicans raised hogs; in 2002, fewer than 5,000 continued to do so.107 Before NAFTA, 
Mexico imported only 5 percent of its needs; in 2002, it imported 40 percent.108 Corn 
prices dropped as well. In 1993, corn was $4.84 per bushel, which dropped to $3.65 in 
1997.109 From 2000-2003, the price fell another 45 percent.110 As was expected by many 
of the proponents and opponents of NAFTA, Mexican farmers were simply unable to 
compete with American farmers. There are two reasons for this. First, farmers in the 
United States tend to be more efficient because of access to better fertilizers, equipment, 
crop genes, climate, and soil. Second, U.S. agriculture was heavily subsidized. One 
report claimed, “U.S corn was sold in Mexico from 1999 through 2001 at prices 30 
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percent or more below the cost of production.”111 These subsidies served as de facto 
tariffs against which Mexican farmers could not compete. The imbalance grew even 
greater in 2002 when the U.S. Farm Bill increased a number of subsidies.112   
 Mexican farmers responded to NAFTA in a variety of ways. Some organized and 
held protests in Mexico.113 Others tried to find work in the factories that NAFTA was 
supposed to bring to Mexico, but industrial growth was unable to absorb all of the 
people looking for work. This was especially true after China joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001. Mexico tried to prevent this move; they were the last country to 
approve China’s entry into the WTO, but once they approved it, they saw their cheap 
labor competitive advantage slip away.114 By 2003, China had displaced Mexico as the 
second largest exporter to the United States. In some parts of Mexico, more than 30 
percent of the assembly plant jobs created in the 1990s moved to China and other lower-
wage counties.115  
 The Mexican economy faced other difficulties as well in the years since the 
passage of NAFTA. In 1994-1995, the markets devalued the peso again.116 The U.S. 
government assisted with the crisis, but for many foreign investors, this was another sign 
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of the instability of Mexico. When the global recession hit in 2008, Mexico suffered 
along with other counties. The number of Mexicans who were facing the “slow and 
silent violence of starvation” increased from 18 million in 2008 to 20 million in 2010.117 
Overall, since NAFTA passed, things have been very difficult in Mexico. Productivity 
went up 80 percent, yet poverty remained high. In 2008, moderate poverty was at nearly 
50 percent with extreme poverty at nearly 20 percent.118  
    Many Mexicans did not stay to protest for change or look for work in Mexico. 
Instead, they abandoned their farms or left their cities and headed north to the U.S. 
Throughout the history of the United States, there has always been some immigration 
from Mexico, but during the last fifty years, the number of immigrants has increased. In 
1960, fewer than 33,000 immigrants came from Mexico, accounting for just 12.3 percent 
of all immigrants and 55.2 percent of Latino immigrants.119 By 1978, the number had 
increased to 92,367, which represented 15.4 percent of all immigrants and 47 percent of 
all Latino immigrants.120 During the 1980s and 1990s, Latinos started to immigrate at a 
higher rate but congregated primarily in the southwest and larger cities.121 After NAFTA 
was passed and its effects started to be felt, especially in the Mexican countryside, the 
rate of immigration picked up considerably. The rate accelerated to the point at which 
                                                        
117
 Laura Carlsen,  “NAFTA is Starving Mexico,” The Institute for Policy Studies October 20, 2011, 1-6.  
118
 Elisabeth Malkin, “Nafta’s Promise, Unfulfilled,” The New York Times, March 24, 2009; Villarreal, 
“Mexican Economy,” 6. 
119
 Massy and Schnabel use the term Hispanic as was common that the time of their article, but for the 
sake of simplicity will only use the term Latino/a. Douglas S. Massey and Kathleen M. Schnabel, “Recent 
Trends in Hispanic Immigration to the United States,” International Migration Review 17 (Summer 1983): 
212-244. 
120
 Ibid. 
121
 Phillip Martin, J. Edward Taylor, and Michael Fix, “Immigration and the Changing Face of Rural 
America: Focus on the Midwestern States,” Report by the Julian Samora Research Institute.  
 49
approximately 5,000 foreigners crossed the U.S.-Mexican border every day in 1999.122 
Of these, authorities apprehended 4,000 people immediately upon entry into the U.S., 
leaving 1,000 successful entries per day. At this point, sizable immigrant communities 
started to develop across the entire county, including in places like Iowa.  
 The rapid increase in immigration changed the makeup of Iowa and helped it 
recover from the population loss caused by the farm crisis. Iowa experienced an increase 
in the Latino population of 150 percent between 1990 and 2000, bringing the total up 
from 49,826 to 82,473.123 The overwhelming majority of these Latino immigrants hailed 
from Mexico, with all other national origins combined accounting for less than a quarter 
of the Latino population.124 Many immigrants, including non-Latinos who settled in 
Iowa, were undocumented. These numbers are difficult to accurately determine, but, 
according to the Urban Institute, 30-39 percent of all foreign-born people living in Iowa 
in 2000 were undocumented.125    
 Many Latino immigrants were drawn to small towns across Iowa where 
meatpacking plants operated. These facilities offered low wages for hard work in 
undesirable conditions, but they were also willing to hire immigrants, even those who 
could not speak English or who did not have proper documentation to work in the United 
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States. Indeed, in many cases, meat processors specifically recruited immigrants.126 
Turnover rates at these facilities were incredibly high, and as a result, packing plants 
usually had job openings.127 At one time people considered meat processing a “blue 
collar elite” job offering high pay and union protections, but in the 1970s and 1980s, 
most of the packing plants restructured or came under new management.128 Automation 
reduced the total number of employees and the level of skill required in the industry. 
Although the number of jobs in the industry have decreased over the years, meatpacking 
plants are still among the largest employers in most towns, and usually they are the 
single largest by far. For example, in 1990, the town of Storm Lake had a population of 
8,800; its two packing plants employed 2,000 people.129 Packing plants not only 
determined the economic wellbeing of these towns, but they also defined the culture. 
Everyone shared a connection to the plant. If one did not work there, someone one knew 
did. The packing plant defined many towns in Iowa as Anglo blue-collar towns, but as 
the plants changed, so did the collective identity of these communities.    
 Undoubtedly, many people disliked the changing identity of their small nearly 
all-Anglo towns, but others appreciated the newcomers. Since the downsizing of the 
meat processing industry and the farm crisis hit around the same time, many packing 
towns experienced sizable drops in population in the 1980s. Young people who could 
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not take over the family farm or work at the packing plant as their parents had left the 
state in droves. Immigrants helped turn the trend around. As one report stated, “Iowa’s 
population grew by over 150,000 through the 1990s, mostly through the immigration of 
young, working-age individuals.”130 Adding “this growth…[was] a good beginning 
toward solving the problem of Iowa’s aging workforce.” In Marshalltown, St. Mary’s 
Catholic Church held a separate mass in Spanish. Of the 287 attendees, fewer than 
twenty appeared to be over the age of 30, according to one observer.131 
 CCI organizers and members witnessed this influx in the immigrant population in 
the late 1990s and decided the organization needed to work with the immigrants. Many 
felt a natural solidarity with those forced to leave their farms and their way of life due to 
market forces and policy decisions that were beyond their control. Between 1999 and 
2003, organizers started to talk to members about the possibility of working with the 
Latino community. Many members like Larry Ginter were excited about the chance to 
organize a segment of the population that faced incredible challenges. Other members 
were less enthusiastic. They questioned whether the political fallout of working with 
immigrants, some of whom could be undocumented, would be worth it. Some 
undoubtedly opposed the presence of undocumented immigrants and had no desire to 
help. After years of quiet one-on-one discussions that eventually became a public 
discussion, the majority had made itself clear. CCI would reach out to the Latino 
population, and they would start in Marshalltown.132 
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 CCI hired Anna Galovich, a Spanish-speaking organizer, and set about building a 
relationship with the Latino community of Marshalltown. Galovich spent the better part 
of a year eating dinner and drinking coffee with key people in the community. She met 
with religious leaders, elected officials, employees at the community college, members 
of the business community, and a large number of Latinos, most of whom worked at the 
Swift & Company meatpacking plant. She read newspaper accounts, academic papers, 
and government reports in order to understand the community as much as possible. She 
found out that community leaders embraced the growing Latino presence. “They all 
wanted a piece of the Latino pie,” Galovich later said, “The community college, the 
politicians, the business community, they all wanted to be involved with the Latinos.”133  
 It is not surprising that Marshalltown’s institutions supported the growing 
immigrant population given their situation. One headline that addressed the state applied 
to Marshalltown as well. It read, “Iowa’s immigrant-friendly policies aren’t wildly 
popular among its residents. However, the state has no choice. It needs the people.”134 
Marshalltown’s population had decreased by 6.5 percent throughout the 1980s.135 In the 
1990s, its population experienced a net gain of less than one thousand people or 3.5 
percent.136 However, during the 1990s, the Latino population grew from 248 people, or 
0.9 percent, to 3,265, or 12 percent.137 Without the increase in Latinos, the town would 
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have had a net loss of thousands of people. The schools filled back up and Main Street 
began to show signs of life again. In 2005, a local newspaper article boasted about the 25 
new Latino-owned businesses in “previously boarded up commercial spaces,” which had 
been vacant since the 1980s.138  
 Marshalltown had immigrants from several places across the globe, but the vast 
majority of them came from Mexico. Indeed, most of them came from a single small 
rural town in Mexico: Villachuato. Anthropologist Mark Grey estimated that 2,000 to 
3,000 immigrants who lived in Marshalltown at the time of his study in 2002 came from 
this Mexican town. In 2000, Villachuato had a population of only 4,199. NAFTA had 
driven many of Villachuato residents north across the U.S. boarder. Many of them made 
it all the way to Marshalltown, where community leaders encouraged them to stay. 
While on an educational trip with other community leaders to the small Mexican town 
that sits two hours west of Mexico City, the Mayor of Marshalltown said of his 
intentions, “I was being self-serving. We need people.”139  
While treated fairly by most of the leaders and institutions in the community, 
Marshalltown Latinos had a completely different relationship with the Swift plant that 
employed a large share of them. In interview after interview, Galovich heard about, and 
the newspapers covered, the horrible conditions at the plant. One employee reportedly 
broke his foot. The company nurse only gave him ice and ibuprofen.140 Maria Cedeno 
asked to use the restroom because she felt nauseous due to her pregnancy; her supervisor 
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refused her request, so she vomited while “slaughtering pigs.”141 Another women, who 
went by the pseudonym Ana Moreno, fell down the stairs and hurt her back. When she 
complained, the company fired her because she was undocumented, a fact that Moreno 
claims the company was fully aware of when they hired her.142 Swift terminated Maria 
Lira after she complained about an injury she sustained on the job. She had hurt her 
shoulder while “cleaning pig intestines” and her doctor told her to limit the use of the 
injured shoulder. The company responded by firing her.143 These types of conditions 
have been a common feature of the meatpacking industry. They were present in 
Sinclair’s The Jungle and were still common in the industry more than 100 years later. A 
2005 report by Human Rights Watch placed the meatpacking industry third on the list of 
most dangerous industries in America.144  
 If CCI wanted the Latino community to take them seriously, they needed to 
improve the conditions at Swift. Galovich’s research and outreach made it clear that the 
conditions at Swift were the single greatest concern for Marshalltown’s new immigrants. 
CCI organizers decided they were going to work with immigrants against the exact same 
giant meatpacking corporation – Swift & Company – as Saul Alinsky had done in the 
Back of the Yards in the 1930s. This time, however, CCI would find itself pitted against 
the union as well.145 
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 The United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) represented the 
employees at Swift, but according to many employees, the union stood up for the 
company more often than employees. CCI was not excited about picking a fight with the 
union; after all, the Latino project was brand new, Galovich was new to organizing, the 
Latino leaders had little to no experience, and unions were not only tough, but also the 
natural allies of groups like CCI. This hesitation did nothing to quell the consistent 
reports of the union representatives ignoring workers’ complaints or even worse, 
negotiating with the workers to strengthen the company’s hand.146 
CCI organizers did not intend to represent the workers in the same way a union 
would. In fact, they thought the ideal solution would be to fix the problems with the 
union so that it might start to address the conditions in the plant. They first reached out 
to the union and attempted to set up a meeting. The union refused to meet. The UFCW 
already suspected CCI, who had been working with their union members for over a year, 
of attempting to encroach on union territory. CCI increased the pressure by calling the 
union, sending emails, and mailing letters in an attempt to set up a meeting. The union 
stalled. Then, CCI sent members to one of the union’s monthly member meetings. A few 
of CCI’s Latino leaders who also belonged to the union showed up at the meeting and 
demanded the union meet with CCI, but again the UFCW refused. Finally, CCI decided 
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to “hit” the union shop.147 In February 2004, two-dozen CCI members, mostly Latinos, 
marched in the UFCW office and demanded that the union hear their grievances. Tim 
Olsen, the head of the UFCW at Swift, kicked the loud CCI members out of the office 
without agreeing to a meeting and making it clear that he would never agree to the 
meeting. It was clear that the union was not willing to address the workers’ complaints, 
and CCI did not yet have a large enough presence in the community to force the union to 
meet. Further, if CCI could not produce any results, the members would stop being 
involved and the Latino project would not even get off the ground.148      
CCI members and organizers had no choice but to circumvent the union and go 
directly after Swift. CCI started the same process in attempting to meet with Swift 
management. They called, sent letters and emails, and members asked management to 
meet in person, but all to no effect. Over the course of more than a year, convincing the 
Swift management to change its ways was the top priority. CCI held a series of planning 
meetings that served as a chance to brainstorm ideas about how to pressure management 
but also gave people a venue to vent about the horrible working conditions at the plant.  
In the fall of 2005, CCI decided to make another hit. This time the target was the 
highest-ranking Swift employee in the state and the location was his home. The night of 
the hit was cold and cloudy. When CCI members got to his home at 9:00 p.m., it was 
dark. As Fagan recalled, “it felt like the middle of the night.” With their list of demands 
in hand, 15 Latinos knocked on their boss’s door and demanded he address their 
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grievances. His wife answered the door. She was holding a baby and was visibly 
frightened. Within a few minutes, the door closed and the police were on their way. 
There was no meaningful conversation and no meeting time was set. CCI and the 
workers at Swift had met another dead end.149  
Understanding that any progress on the Swift front would be very difficult and 
time consuming, CCI organizers knew they needed to provide something for the Latino 
community if they were going to be taken seriously by them. CCI would need more 
members in order to bring enough pressure to bear on Swift to make a difference, but 
without any immediate benefit, Latinos saw little reason to join. Organizers set about 
working on new types of projects including the establishment of a soccer league, the 
hosting of two “Big Ass Dances” (BADs), and a dinner featuring Mexican cuisine. Some 
of these events helped raise money, but primarily, organizers intended them to provide 
the community with social events. Unlike most of CCI’s work, the soccer league, BADs, 
and dinner did not focus on bringing about social justice, at least not directly. This 
appeared to be out of character for an organization about which Hugh Espey said, “we 
are not a group that sits around having potlucks and griping about things. We go out 
there and get things done.”150 When asked if these social events could be seen as a break 
with CCI’s past or its mission, Joe Fagan, half-yelling and half-laughing, loudly 
proclaimed, “Of course not, hell I’ve organized around cracked street curbs before.”151 
He went on to explain how not every fight was going to be ideal and that sometimes the 
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organization had to do certain things in order to get people involved with the 
organization.152 
There was also a cultural component. CCI organizers lived in Des Moines and 
the organization had few active non-Latino members in Marshalltown. With nearly 
everyone either looking to get a “piece of the Latino pie” or hoping that the Latino 
community would “go home,” there was a great deal of suspicion among many Latinos 
when it came to predominantly Anglo organizations. Then there was the language issue 
and concerns about legal status. The soccer league, BADs, and dinner would be a chance 
for CCI to demonstrate not only their ability to get things done, but also their cultural 
competency and genuine concern about the lives of Latinos. 
CCI’s first attempt to reach out to the Latino community in a cultural way came 
in late 2004, when they hosted “A Taste of Mexico Fundraising Dinner.”153 At the 
suggestion of the Latino members, the fledgling Marshalltown group hosted a dinner 
aimed at developing bonds with and soliciting funds from supportive Anglo members of 
the community. The dinner featured homemade Mexican fare prepared by CCI members. 
Several dozen, mostly Anglo, community members attended the event. Latino leaders 
were pleased with the event, but decided that future events should focus on the Latino 
community instead of Anglos. The next year and a half saw the focus shift in just that 
way. There were two Big Ass Dances, both of which drew crowds numbering several 
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hundred. This again gave CCI the chance to raise money for the Latino project, but most 
importantly, hundreds of new people interacted with CCI for the first time. The Latino 
community saw that CCI organizers cared about them and had the ability to improve 
their lives, even if only by hosting a dance. CCI pulled the dinner and the dances 
together rather easily, and knew that these discrete one-time events offered little long-
term connections with the Latino community, so they set about organizing a soccer 
league. After working for about a year with the city to gain access to fields and bringing 
together enough teams, the league finally started. On April 9, 2006, “300 Hispanic adults” 
showed up at Bicentennial Park to kick off the games.154 The soccer league, dances, and 
dinners helped CCI make connections and grow its member and leadership base among 
the Marshalltown Latino community, but these activities would become almost 
completely forgotten in just a few short months.155 
On December 12, 2006, federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
agents, accompanied by more than 100 Department of Homeland Security agents, raided 
the Swift & Company meatpacking plant in Marshalltown and arrested 99 people.156 The 
raid was one of six on Swift plants that took place across the country, which resulted in 
the arrest of 1,282 people.157 The raid intended to arrest people who had forged or stolen 
federal documents, such as social security cards, in order to work illegally, as well as 
those employers who knowingly hired people under false pretenses. The effects of this 
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raid tore the community apart. For some people, several days passed before they found 
out where their family members were. Many families had both parents detained, leaving 
their children to fend for themselves for days.158 In one case, the agents detained a 
breastfeeding baby’s mother.159 With fewer than 100 people detained, only a small 
percentage of Marshalltown’s Latino community felt the effects directly, but everyone in 
the town felt the impact in some way. Fear gripped the community. People pulled their 
kids out of school, stopped shopping, and did not show up to work, while others left 
town altogether.160 Marshalltown businesses suffered and home sales plummeted.161 
Twenty-nine people received convictions in federal court on charges related to the Swift 
raids. Six hundred and forty-nine people were deported.162 
Immigration agents carried out the six raids on Swift & Company as part of 
“Operation Return to Sender,” which resulted in the deportation of 14,000 immigrants 
who worked in the country illegally.163 ICE used the high profile raids in part to publicly 
demonstrate its efforts against “illegal immigration,” which was an explosive political 
issue at the time. The United States Congress voted on comprehensive immigration 
reform bills in 2005, 2006, and 2007, but failed to pass any legislation on the issue.164 
                                                        
158
 Jerry Perkins, “‘What a Sad Day it is,’ Woman’s Husband Says,” The Des Moines Resister, December 
13, 2006.  
159
 Lisa Rossi, “Breastfeeding Baby’s Mom Among Those Detained,” The Des Moines Register, 
December 13, 2006. 
160
 Joe Fagan, personal interview, March 14, 2012; Anna Galovich, personal interview, March 19, 2012. 
161
 Perkins and Piller, “A Year After.”  
162
 Ibid. 
163
 Juliana Barbassa, “High Profile Raids Leave Immigrants in Fear Nationwide,” Associated Press, 
February 18, 2007, www.mercurynews.com, (accessed June 12, 2012).  
164
 “Bill Summary & Status 1009th Congress (2005-2006) S. 2611,” Library of Congress, 
http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN02611:@@@L&summ2=m&, (accessed June 12, 
2012); “‘Gang of 12’ Mulls Over Immigration Bill,” Associated Press, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18842287/#.UCfVM-3N7zI, Updated May 25, 2007. 
 61
The national media provided wall-to-wall coverage of everything immigration related, 
from the raids to “citizen immigration enforcement groups.”165 For several years, while 
the nation was debating immigration policy, CCI and the Latinos in Marshalltown 
focused almost exclusively on local issues. After the raids, that stopped.  
National comprehensive immigration reform became a top priority for CCI and 
like-minded groups across the nation. Organizations had been holding rallies, protests, 
vigils, and marches for several years, but after the raids, the crowds grew and the 
frequency of the events picked up in Iowa. More non-Latino CCI members started to get 
involved in the Latinos’ cause. For CCI, and its new Latino organizer, Erica Palmer, the 
solution to the many problems facing the people of Marshalltown seemed to reside in 
Washington D.C.166  
By the time Palmer introduced herself to the Latino community, the state 
suffered another raid. This time it happened in Postville.167 Postville, Iowa stood out 
from the rest of the state well before the raids. It is located in the northeastern corner of 
the state, has a population of just over 2,200, and from 1987 to 2008 was home of the 
nation’s largest kosher food producer, Agriprocessors. The Hasidic Jews that ran 
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Agriprocessors transformed the otherwise typical small farming community. With the 
arrival of Agriprocessors, the homogeneity that characterized Postville, like most small 
Iowa towns, vanished as they recruited immigrants from across the world. This small 
town soon became the home of Guatemalans, Mexicans, Somalis, the ultra-orthodox 
Hasidic Jews, and a handful of immigrants from other countries as well. All of these 
religions, cultures, dietary habits, languages, and biases were crammed into a few square 
miles that sat nearly an hour from the closest big city (by Iowa standards) of 
Waterloo/Cedar Falls (home to approximately 100,000 people) and four hours from 
Chicago. The animosity that resulted from the bringing together of so many cultures in 
such a small town garnered a lot of attention. Stephen G. Bloom described these 
conflicts in his book Postville: A Clash of Cultures in Heartland America, published in 
2000. Bloom writes: “To understand Postville and the Jews whose business came to 
dominate the town was to learn about influence and power. The Hasidic Jews brought 
unimaginable turmoil to Postville, so much that few of the Postville elders or their 
children would ever forget what these newcomers had done.”168 
The “unimaginable turmoil” Bloom described focused mostly on cultural conflict 
resulting from the fact that, according to Bloom, “the Jews had also become Postville’s 
ruling class. They were in charge, and the locals didn’t like that at all.”169 He did not, 
however, describe the unimaginable conditions in the kosher meatpacking plant that 
helped elevate its owners to the “ruling class.” Before the raids, the state knew about 
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Agriprocessors’ habitual violations of labor, environmental, and food production laws. 
Regulators issued several small fines throughout the years, but the press gave the facility 
little attention until after the raids, so the public knew very little. After the raids, the 
brutal conditions of the plant saturated the newspapers. One article told the story of a 
Somali refugee who was “promised a bonus and a free month’s rent to come [and work 
for Agriprocessors].”170 After working 48 hours in his first week, the company paid him 
$8.61. Agriprocessors refused to allow inspectors in the facility and required its 
employees to purchase their own protective gear.171 Another article described how 
Carlos Torrez severed one of his fingers while separating chicken parts after working 67 
hours in one week. When the same thing happened to two other workers in just five 
weeks, the company received a fine of $7,500.172 Governor Chet Culver penned an op-ed 
excoriating the company for allegedly using “child labor,” “sexual and physical abuse,” 
“nonpayment of regular and overtime wages,” and “denial of immediate medical 
attention.”173 The company’s repeated violations of the law had spurred the state of Iowa 
into opening an extensive investigation into the company’s labor violations. According 
to an op-ed written by Professor Erik Camayd-Freixas, the raid “thwarted the state labor 
investigation,” preventing law enforcement from pursuing the “over 9,000 state labor 
charges.”174    
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 On May 12, 2008, hundreds of federal agents from ICE and the U.S. Marshals 
Service stormed the Agriprocessors plant to round up undocumented workers. Unlike 
Marshalltown, this time they brought 687 criminal warrants into the 800-employee 
plant.175 The raid in Marshalltown focused almost exclusively on administrative 
immigration enforcement. In Marshalltown, ICE wanted to find undocumented 
immigrants and ship them back to their native country. Now, in what the New York 
Times called a “twist of Dickensian cruelty,” the federal agencies sought prison terms 
and felony charges for the immigrants before their deportation.176 The raid resulted in 
the arrest of 389 people.177 Federal authorities took most of the adults to a makeshift 
detention center they had constructed at the National Cattle Congress in Waterloo, Iowa. 
They took the children they arrested to detention facilities in other states.178   
 The political climate demanded the Bush administration show that they meant 
what they said about getting tough on illegal immigrants. Postville provided a perfect 
opportunity to carry out an enormously high profile raid that not only punished the 
immigrants, but also provided an example to the other immigrants of what they might 
have to face. As one immigration attorney put it, “Postville wasn’t meant to crack down 
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on undocumented workers, it was a made-for-television event.”179 If the massive raid 
made for great optics and provided a political advantage, the prolonged detention of 
hundreds of racial and ethnic minorities in what amounted to a rundown livestock 
processing facility provided the exact opposite outcome. Furthermore, just days before 
the Postville raid, the New York Times reported that 66 immigrants had died while in 
custody between 2004 and 2007. Any prolonged detention could potentially increase that 
number.180 In an effort to move things along quickly, the authorities constructed a 
temporary courtroom by hanging up black curtains in an old dance hall.181 In a matter of 
four days, 297 people pleaded guilty to various crimes. Of these, 270 received prison 
sentences of at least five months, some served more than a year, and all were deported 
upon release.182  
 For CCI, the Postville raid posed a new set of challenges, while providing its 
members a chance to help show leadership and offer support to another community. 
Erica Palmer realized the scope of what she faced the moment she heard the news. She 
lived and worked in Des Moines, a solid three and a half hour drive from Postville. She 
immediately started to hear rumors of a large detention center in Waterloo. In a way that 
helped; it was only a two-hour drive to Waterloo. In another way that hurt; she lived in 
Des Moines, the detention center was in Waterloo, and the families of the detained lived 
in Postville. To make matters worse, CCI had no active leaders in the far northeastern 
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part of the state. For that matter, it had very few members at all in the Postville area. 
Palmer drove to Waterloo and attempted to figure out what had happened. She talked to 
people in restaurants, bars, churches, and eventually El Centro Latinoamericano, a small 
nonprofit that prior to the raid primarily offered English as a second language classes a 
few nights a week, but after the raid became one of the help centers for family members 
and supporters who wanted to help. Palmer got a cheap motel room, which would 
become her home for the next six weeks. She shared the motel with several ICE 
agents.183  
CCI and other organizations scrambled to help those arrested in the raid as well 
as their families. CCI leaders from Marshalltown and others from the Waterloo-Cedar 
Falls area came to lend a hand. The Center for Community Change, one of CCI’s allied 
organizations, sent three organizers to live and help in Waterloo for the several weeks 
following the raid. Churches and other nonprofits in Postville and Waterloo provided 
food, childcare, emotional support, and help with bills. People scrambled to arrange 
legal advice for those who were arrested and the nearly 300 who avoided arrest at the 
plant but who had warrants out for their arrest.184 Everyone tried to figure out the 
location of those arrested and how to get them in contact with their loved ones. CCI 
helped organize a solidarity march through Waterloo.  
On Sunday, May 18, 2008, more than 400 people marched three miles from the 
Queen of Peace Parish to the gates of the prison on the National Cattle Congress 
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grounds.185 There they held signs that read, “Let My Dad Go,” and “You Are the 
Criminals for Leaving Kids Without Parents. Free Us.”186 They also gave speeches that 
condemned the politicians and bureaucrats who ordered the raid, the broken immigration 
system that put people in this situation in the first place, and the foot soldiers who 
carried out what they saw as morally reprehensible orders. They also spoke to the 
imprisoned. Even though chain link fence and armed men standing with German 
Shepherds at heal stood in between the crowd and the prisoners, wives and children 
spoke to their husbands and fathers, even if they heard nothing in return.187 Some of the 
speakers were from Marshalltown, and the march was led in part by a group holding a 
large banner that “announced they played for a Marshalltown soccer league.”188 
CCI’s plan worked. The people with whom they engaged on a social and cultural 
basis came to understand the organization and its causes. The Marshalltown raid showed 
them firsthand how destructive the current immigration system could be, and their 
connection with CCI provided them with direct course to action when the same type of 
destruction hit another community. Marshalltown Latinos provided as much help as they 
could and provided leadership when appropriate. CCI successfully developed a core 
group of leaders in Marshalltown who demonstrated an ability and willingness to look 
beyond their immediate community to help the larger immigrant community as a whole. 
The political climate quickly changed a few months later with the election of 
President Barack Obama. The economic collapse that hit in the fall of 2008 significantly 
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reduced the rate of immigration into the country, and immigration enforcement also 
changed with the expansion of Secure Communities, which uses data sharing between 
ICE and the FBI to identify and remove undocumented immigrants on an individual 
basis as opposed to large sweeping raids.189 With the recession, the media turned its 
attention away from immigration. CCI also modified its Latino efforts since the raid, 
expanding its work in order to become a larger statewide presence and working on new 
issues including wage theft.  
Working with Latino immigrants was a natural fit for CCI. Alinsky started 
working with immigrants employed in the meatpacking district, and CCI had spent more 
than a decade working with people who had been pushed out of farming. Even with this 
history, CCI had a difficult time developing a strong contingency of Latino members and 
leaders. By focusing on the social bonds and helping during times of tragedy, CCI 
organizers eventually broke through the cultural differences. This does not mean that 
CCI was able to improve the working conditions at Swift or any other packing plant, but 
it does mean that some Latinos have an organization they are comfortable working with 
on issues of social justice. So far, it seems to have paid off. In the less than two years 
since CCI has been working on wage theft, organizers have recovered and returned over 
$150,000 in wages owed to undocumented workers.190 Most of these wages were won 
back by a young, aggressive organizer named Ruth Shultz who worked with Latinos in 
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Des Moines. Her first experience with organizing occurred when she marched as a child 
with her father during the farm crisis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE NEXT LEG OF THE RUN 
 
 
As an organization based on the work and ideas of Saul Alinksy, CCI has spent 
the last 37 years fighting for justice at the local level by means of direct action and other 
forms of confrontational social pressure. It managed to stay remarkably true to the 
principles Alinsky laid out and practiced himself more than 75 years ago in Chicago. 
Even though the political climate and economic circumstances had grown in many ways 
more conservative since Alinsky’s lifetime, CCI continued to pursue radical ends using 
radical means. At a time when activism as a whole took a conciliatory turn and activists 
sought compromise and cooperation as opposed to radical change, CCI stood out from 
its contemporaries.  
During the nearly four decades of its existence, CCI has accomplished a lot. 
When the farm crisis demolished the economy and way of life for many people in Iowa 
and across the Midwest, CCI members and organizers pushed back against the bankers, 
bureaucrats, and elected officials. They mobilized people across the state to support the 
minimum pricing bill. They pressured legislators in unique ways, such as distributing 
flyers in the legislative chamber in the middle of the night. They also worked with other 
groups to hold a massive 15,000 person rally in Ames demanding action, which resulted 
in the bill making it to the Governor’s desk before he vetoed it. Pressuring the Farmer 
Home Administration and the Farm Credit Services also yielded results and made more 
credit available to farmers in need. CCI members and organizers also went after banks 
like Norwest on behalf of individual farmers who were struggling to keep their homes. 
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This campaign resulted in well over $5 million in loans for farmers in need. Each victory 
and any number of the numerous defeats that occurred during this time can be at least 
partially attributed to CCI’s confrontational approach. 
In the aftermath of the farm crisis in the U.S. and the effects of NAFTA in 
Mexico, CCI members and organizers reached out to Iowa’s growing Latino immigrant 
community. After years of developing relationships with the Latinos in Marshalltown 
through non-confrontational, non-social justice-oriented projects like dinners, dances, 
and soccer leagues, CCI was able to transition its relationship with the Latino 
community from a purely social one to one based on fighting for change. CCI’s first 
attempts at changing the working conditions in the Swift meatpacking plant were rocky 
and ultimately unsuccessful. Things did not turn around until the immigration raid on 
that very same Marshalltown plant. Another raid provided the Marshalltown Latino CCI 
members a chance to develop as leaders and help others who were experiencing what 
their community was still recovering from at that time. These leaders and new outreach 
to Latinos statewide resulted in tens of thousands of dollars in returned stolen wages as 
well as a growing number of Latinos who became involved in the organization. These 
new members have used direct action and other confrontational methods to recover their 
wages.   
 CCI found its niche in Iowa activism. It uses aggressive methods to pressure 
those in charge to bend to the will of the powerless. This method was handed down to 
Joe Fagan and the rest of the CCI members and organizers from Saul Alinsky, who in 
turn had amalgamated it from Capone, Lewis, and the Chicago pragmatists. Alinsky’s 
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ideas have animated CCI for more than three decades, and therefore his thoughts on 
history might be illuminating. He once wrote, “History is a relay of revolutions; the 
torch of idealism is carried by the revolutionary group until this group becomes an 
establishment, and then quietly the torch is put down to wait until a new revolutionary 
group picks it up for the next leg of the run.”191 If this is true, and if during the 30 years 
since the Reagan Revolution took place CCI has steadily grown from one employee to 
nearly 30 and from zero members to several thousand, one has to wonder what it will be 
able to do during the next leg of the run.  
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